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CASE COMMENTS

Stull,'" the West Virginia court indicated that an opinion of speed
based on the damaged condition of a vehicle is a proper subject
matter for expert opinion. The court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to permit a conclusion by a witness whether an automobile
was traveling at a high rate of speed when it struck a rock ledge.
The court stated that "the opinion of a witness, who had merely
observed an automobile after it had come to rest against an
obstruction, as to its speed at the moment of impact, was properly
excluded where there was no attempt to qualify such witness as
an expert.""
Thus, the interesting question arises whether the West Virginia
Supreme Court would allow an expert such as a "traffic accident
analyse" 9 to give his opinion of speed based on the damage to the
car and its position against an object after impact. Its most recent
decision indicates that it might be willing to recognize that this
area is a proper subject matter for expert testimony. Such a view,
however, would be contrary to that of Virginia and the majority
of jurisdictions.
Louis Sweetland Southworth, 11

Property-Effect of Alteration of Recordable Instruments
X signed a deed granting property to D. Although not signed
in S's presence, S,notary public and secretary for D's attorney,
acknowledged the signature after inquiry of X and other witnesses.
Upon the return of the three page executed deed to D's attorney,
the words "and appurtenances thereunto belonging" were added to
the deed, the first page being retyped and inserted in place of the
original first page, the other two pages, containing the signature
and acknowledgment, remaining intact. This draft was returned
to X, who orally reacknowledged her signature, although no new
notarial certificate was added. The notary left the deed in possession of X. Later, D's attorney received the deed from D, and had
the deed properly recorded. Ps, heirs-at-law of X, sought to have
this deed declared void because of lack of execution or delivery.
17140 W. Va. 31, 82 S.E.2d 278 (1954).
18Supra note 17, syl. 4. (Emphasis added.)
19Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 595, 130 S.E.2d 80, 94 (1963).
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The trial court held that the deed should be set aside because at
no time did X execute or deliver this deed to the D. Held: Reversed and remanded. The alteration of a deed of conveyance does
not revest the title of the land in the grantor. As the words added
caused no material change in the deed, it was effective as between
the parties, providing a valid execution and delivery could be
found. From the evidence that the grantee had possession of the
deed, and that it was submitted for recordation, and accepted and
recorded, it was concluded that the necessary delivery was present,
and, thus, all the requirements of a valid deed between the parties
were met. Evans v. Bottomlee, 148 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1966).
In the principal case, the West Virginia Supreme Court approved
an alteration of a deed after execution, because the words added
were superfluous and all the necessary elements of a valid transaction were present. The decision raises some perplexing and
rather interesting questions. When will the court allow altered
instruments to survive? Now that the altered deed is recorded,
does it posses a lawful acknowledgment that serves as constructive
notice to third parties without notice of such deed? Did the court
use language that is in accordance with the weight of authority
concerning these questions?
The court did not dwell on the subject of the materiality of an
alteration. It simply held that the words added were immaterial
and that were they not added, they would be implied by statute,
which states that "every deed conveying land shall, unless an
exception be made therein, be construed to include all buildings,
privileges, and appurtenances of every kind belonging to the
lands therein embraced."' The court allowed this deed to be
operative in its revised form. It is well settled, as this decision
holds, that an immaterial change in an instrument does not2 nullify
the instrument or affect any interest transferred thereby.
The question of materiality merits a close examination. A
material alteration can be defined as one that changes the meaning
of the instrument, so that the legal effect of the instrument and
'W.

VA. CODE

ch. 36, art. 3, § 10 (Michie 1961).

2 Fisherdick v. Hutton, 44 Neb. 122, 62 N.W. 488 (1895)
lien).
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the legal rights of the parties become altered.3 Conversely, an
immaterial alteration is one which does not affect the legal meaning of the instrument.4 It is obvious that the principal case
follows the definition of the latter, and is in line with cases
that hold an alteration to be immaterial when it merely incorporates into the instrument terms which tend to clarify provisions
that would be implied from the language therein used.'
Another factor to consider for the purpose of noticing the
effect of an alteration is the lack of consent of both parties to any
alteration made. There is no need to consider an immaterial
alteration, such as in the principal case, because if the instrument
is held to be unchanged and unaffected by the addition of the
words, the consent of the parties to such alteration is itself of
no materiality. The courts are divided, however, upon the question
of the effect of consent on a material alteration. It is generally
accepted that no alteration, when made with or without the
consent of both parties to the instrument, can divest an estate
previously vested by the original deed; that is, the terms of the
deed as originally executed are not voided.6 It is also held that a
deed, where materially altered without the knowledge or consent
of one of the parties to it, is not binding as altered.7 The split
of authority occurs in ruling upon the effectiveness of the instrument in its altered condition, where such alteration is made
with the consent of all parties to it. Some authorities feel that
the most just principle is to hold the parties to the instrument
bound in its altered form, that the deed remains valid, and the
change is effective without requiring a new delivery or new
3 Morehead

v. Parkersburg Nat'l Bank, 5 W. Va. 74 (1871)

(words

inserted to make promissory note negotiable); Hershman v. Stafford, 58
W. Va. 459, 52 S.E. 533 (1905); Fitzgerald v. Lawson, 96 N.H. 447, 78
A.2d 527 (1951) (change of date in agency agreement).
4 Blenkiron v. Rogers, 87 Neb. 716, 127 N.W. 1062 (1910) (change of
name in contract of sale); Douglass v. Lockhart, 168 S.W. 382 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) (insertion of words "or bearer" in note); Stiles v. City State Bank,
56 Okla. 572, 156 Pac. 622 (1916) (words adding to description in mortgage

deed).
5

Bruegge v. State Bank, 74 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1934) (addition of description in trust deed); Stiles v. City State Bank, supra; John Kindler Co.

v. First Natl Bank, 61 Ind. App. 79, 109 N.E. 66 (1915) (addition of rate
of interest which would have been implied); Fisherdick v. Hutton, 44 Neb.
122, 662 N.W. 488 (1895) (mechanics lien).
Waldron v. Waller, 65 W. Va. 605, 64 S.E. 964 (1909); Woods v.
Hilderbrand, 46 Mo. 284 (1870); Burgess v. Blake, 128 Ala. 105, 28 So.
963 (1900);
1 Dvrm, Danus § 460 (3d ed. 1911).
7
Hollis v. Harris, 96 Ala. 288, 11 So. 337, (1891-92).
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acknowledgment.8 Other cases require a new delivery, holding this
to be effective as a new execution, so as to bind the parties.'
Yet, two early West Virginia cases hold that for the materially
altered instrument to be effective between the parties to it, there
not only should be a new execution and delivery, but also a new
acknowledgment." ° But the West Virginia holding is refuted
emphatically by cases holding that no acknowledgment is necessary
for a deed to be valid between the parties to it and that title passes
by execution and delivery and not by acknowledgment." This is
also in accordance with the laws of West Virginia requiring an
acknowledgment for eligibility for recordation, but not as a
prerequisite to the validity of a deed. 2 It must be emphasized
that this discussion refers only to the validity of the deed as
to the parties to it; the effectiveness of the deed as to creditors
and subsequent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration
will be considered subsequently.
From the foregoing discussion one can see that West Virginia
law is confused concerning whether acceptance of the altered
portion of a deed makes it valid between the parties to it. A logical
position to take would be to combine the views, holding that the
new version, with its material alteration, should be re-executed
and redelivered, but not reacknowledged, in order to be valid as to
the parties to the instrument. By following this rule, no questionable practice of forcing an acknowledgment by the grantor to pass
title is required, yet all the necessary formalities in the execution
and delivery of the deed are met.
The next area to investigate is the effect of the altered deed
on third parties, in both its original and altered forms. The
primary concern in questioning the effect of an altered deed on
third parties is the presence of an acknowledgment, or the necessity
of a reacknowledgment. Until duly admitted to record, all deeds
are void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable
I Starks v. Loftus, 248 S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Walldey v.
Clarke,
107 Iowa 451, 78 N.W. 70 (1899).
9
488, 59 N.E. 958 (1901); Krechel v. Mercer,
Abbott v. Abbott, 189 M11.
262 N.C. 243, 136 S.E.2d 608 (1964). See 67 W. VA. L. REv. 87 (1964).
'°Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 21 (1893); Waldron v. Waller, 65
W. Va. 605, 64 S.E. 964 (1909).
" Rothwell v. Brice, 94 W. Va. 466, 119 S.E. 293 (1923); Gannaway
v. Federal Land Bank, 148 Va. 176, 138 S.E. 564 (1927); Peatross v. Gray,
181 Va.
847, 27 S.E.2d 203 (1943).
12 W. VA. CoDE ch. 39, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1961).
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consideration without notice." The West Virginia Code further
provides that the county clerk shall record any deed, when entitled
to be admitted, when all the signatures to it have been acknowledged, or proved by two witnesses, before such county clerk;' 4 but,
as an alternative, at the election of an interested party, such deed
shall be admitted to record where the signatures are proven by a
certificate of acknowledgment before a justice of the peace, notary
public, or any one of other designated officers, and where such
certificate of acknowledgment is attached upon the deed.'" The
basic premise to be derived from these recording laws is that a
deed whose execution has not been properly acknowledged, or
which has no certificate of acknowledgment attached thereto, is not
entitled to recordation, and even though admitted to record by the
county clerk, such deed is not considered duly admitted to record,
and does not serve as constructive notice to creditors or subsequent
purchasers for valuable consideration without actual notice of the
deed.' 6
Now the altered instrument must be considered in light of
these principles. First, consider a material alteration made by
one of the parties, after the original deed has been executed and
acknowledged. It is generally held that such a deed is not entitled
to recordation and that to be effective as constructive notice to
third parties, the altered deed must not only be re-executed and
redelivered, but must be reacknowledged. Then, once it is recorded
with its new certificate of acknowledgment, it serves as constructive notice of the altered instrument.'7 In Citizens Bank v. Taylor,
after a deed was properly acknowledged, it was revised, changing
the estates granted, and was then delivered and recorded with
no new acknowledgment. In holding that this recorded deed was
not constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, the
court said that the deed was materially altered, and as such
should be considered as a new instrument, needing not only a reexecution and redelivery, but also a new acknowledgment, in order
"4 W. VA.
' W. VA.
"5W.
VA.
6

CODE
CODE
CODE

c&. 40, art. 1, § 9 (Michie 1961).
ch. 39, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1961).
ch. 39, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1961).

' Cox v. Wayt, 26 W. Va. 807 (1884); Ithig v. hUig, 78 W. Va. 360,
88 S.E. 1010 (1916); In re Atlantic Smokeless Coal Co., 103 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. 7W. Va. 1952).

' Wagle v. Iowa State Bank, 175 Iowa 92, 156 N.W. 991 (1916).
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to be eligible for recordation and to serve as constructive notice
to third parties.18

Where the court finds that the change made in the instrument
is immaterial, as is the holding in the principal case, then the
instrument is treated as valid in all its original aspects, with
no new execution needed. In the principal case, the court was
really not too concerned with the acknowledgment aspect after it
concluded that the revision of the deed was immaterial, but concentrated on showing that there was an execution and delivery that
had been carried through to completion. Although the language
used seems to indicate that the court was searching for a redelivery, it hardly seems necessary when the court has decided that
there is nothing changed about the deed or transaction. Likewise,
the court mentions a new oral acknowledgment made by the
grantor, as if necessary. Again, why should a new acknowledgment be needed where it is found that there is nothing new for
which it should be taken? Understandably, a complete re-execution, redelivery and reacknowledgment is required before the
materially altered deed becomes recordable and effective as
constructive notice to third parties. The principal case intimates
that such redelivery and reacknowledgment are also necessary in
the case of an immaterial alteration. A possible alternative would
be to hold that a deed, where immaterially changed, is not only
valid as between the parties to the deed without being re-executed
or redelivered, but is also recordable without the necessity of a new
acknowledgment, and is constructive notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice when
so recorded.
One more ramification of this case should be examined. To
pose a hypothetical situation, suppose the alteration made in the
principal case was one that changed the legal aspect of the deed
materially. Then, after the change, the deed was re-executed
and redelivered, so that the validity of the deed between the
parties to it is restored, but it was subsequently recorded with no
new acknowledgment or new certificate of acknowledgment.
Citizens Bank v. Taylor and other cases, along with the West Virginia Code, show that for an instrument to be constructive notice
18 Citizens Bank v. Taylor, 169 Ga. 203, 149 S.E. 861 (1929); see
Annot., 67 A.L.R. 355 (1930).
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to third parties, it must be properly acknowledged and have the
certificate of acknowledgment annexed to it, and if the acknowledgment is lacking or is defective, it is not entitled to recordation, and
recordation imparts no constructive notice.' 9 In the hypothetical
situation, then, there is no proper acknowledgment, so the altered
deed as recorded would appear not to be constructive notice. But
the problem could arise, where, as in the principal case, the
certificate of acknowledgment looks regular on its face, there
being no indication that there might have been an alteration or
that there is need for a new acknowledgment.
The weight of authority holds that where the defect in the
acknowledgment is latent, the recording of the instrument should
be constructive notice to third parties. " The spirit of the registry
laws favors this view since the county clerks are required to take
instruments for recordation with regular notarial certificates, without regard to possible latent defects; and this view would further
the public's right of reliability on the records to contain truly
valid deeds when recorded.' But other authorities hold that
a defectively acknowledged instrument is never entitled to recordation, whether the defect is apparent on the face of the instrument
or not, and, if allowed on record, it is not constructive notice to
third parties.22 The reasoning of this view is that if a materially
altered deed must be re-executed and redelivered to be valid as
between the parties to it, then it naturally follows that such deed
should be reacknowledged, no matter how valid the first acknowledgment seems, to be eligible for recordation.
The precise point of the manner in which a latent defect in an
acknowledgment should be treated has never arisen in West Virginia in a case concerning an altered instrument. West Virginia has
held, however, that a substantial compliance with the law concerning acknowledgments is all that is necessary in order for an instru-

W.

19Citizens Bank v. Taylor, supra; see 4 TUL. L. REv. 327 (1930);
ch. 39, art. 1, § 2, 3 (Michie 1961); Reirdon v. Smith, 62

VA. CoDE

Okla. 48 161 Pac. 798 (1916) (as to lease); Maguire v. Corbalty Bros.,
133 2F.2d
675 (2d Cir. 1943) (as to conditional sales contract).
0
Woorikdge v. LaCrosse Lumber Co. 291 Mo. 239, 236 S.W. 294
(1921); Franklin Sav. & Loan Co. v. Riddfe, 216 S.C. 367, 57 S.E.2d 910
(1950) (chattel mortgage).
2,
22 45 Am. Jur. Records & Recording Laws § 108 (1943).
LeBrur v. Prosise, 197 Md. 466, 79 A.2d 543 (1951) (deed of trust);
Citizens Natl Bank v. Denison, 165 Ohio St. 89, 133 N.E.2d 329 (1956)
(mortgage).
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ment to be recordable." But this substantial compliance test
does not shed light on West Virginia's view, because these cases
involved claims of some defect in the acknowledgment itself, not
the questioning of an acknowledgment because the instrument
acknowledged was altered. Such a case, then, would be one of first
impression before the West Virginia court.
The principal case shows that an immaterial alteration of a
deed is one leaving the legal effect unchanged, but the case seems
contrary to the weight of authority in its implications that a
re-execution or redelivery was needed subsequent to the immaterial
change to bind the parties to the deed. The principal case also
raises a problem that might be troublesome in the future concerning
the effect of this recorded instrument as constructive notice to
third parties. The majority view would probably consider any
reacknowledgment unnecessary, that the original execution and delivery are valid and binding on the parties to the deed, and that
the original acknowledgment is similarly binding on third parties.
The court in the principal case points out the second oral acknowledgment by the grantor. However, as was noted, the finding that
there was no material alteration of the deed made the discussion of
this second oral acknowledgment pointless. In finding that the
deed was effective with the original signature, the court implied
that the original acknowledgment was also valid. The deed, then,
was completely valid and effective in its altered form.
Robert Brand Stone

Pleading-Alternative Methods of Changing Theory of
Action on Appeal
P, buyer of a mobile home, brought an action to rescind a purchase contract because of defects in the floor. D, (dealer) in turn
initiated a third party complaint against D- (manufacturer). The
Court of Common Pleas rendered judgments in favor of P against
D and in favor of D, against the third party D,. The circuit court
reversed both judgments and entered judgments in favor of D,
23 In re Atlantic Smokeless Coal Co., 103 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. W. Va.
1952); Blake v. Hollandsworth, 71 W. Va. 387, 76 S.E. 814 (1912).
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